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I. INTRODUCTION
The question of freedom of artistic creation, and of its integral
aspect at the boundaries of art, is both intriguing in theoretical terms and
significant in virtually every age and culture. Limitation of freedom of
artistic creation is an issue that crosses various paradigms, hierarchies of
values and normative systems. Given the extent and multifaceted
character of the problem, attempts to determine the boundaries of artistic
freedom have been made in many fields of research, and therefore in the
framework of different scientific disciplines, including the theory and
history of art, aesthetics, art criticism, ethics, economics, theology or
law, to name but a few, each of which with its own specific axiological
and methodological context.
The aim of this paper is to give an introduction to the interpretation
of Article 73 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland (“the
Constitution” or “the CRP”), which provides for freedom of artistic
expression. 1 In particular, the focus is put on the constitutional basis for
legally limiting the freedom of artistic creation in view of the axiological
preferences (decisions) of the organic lawgiver as expressed in the
preamble to the CRP. 2 An emphasis on the axiological foundations of
the law is of importance not only when one postulates a statutory
limitation of artistic activity but also when one attempts to interpret the
provisions already in place in this regard. The system of constitutional
values seems to be the most universal key to a proper understanding and
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a precise definition of any legal boundaries of creative activity.
Jurisprudence assumes that all legal norms, including those limiting the
freedom of artistic expression, are both the emanation and concretization
of any axiological decisions of the organic lawgiver. A legal system is
rooted in a system of values recognized as an axiological foundation of
the legal order, and therefore, in order to correctly decode legal norms
out of the statutes, as well as to initiate legislative changes in conformity
with the requirements of the CRP, it is necessary to accurately identify
the values that the legal system should pursue and secure.
Almost needless to say, the difficulty in achieving the goal so
outlined lies in the fact that any identification of the constitutional values
made in the process of interpreting and applying the law is carried out,
on the one hand, in the actual context of a pluralistic society, in which
different worldviews and value systems compete with each other, and on
the other hand, with a normative reference to Article 25(2) CRP,
pursuant to which public authorities shall be impartial in matters of
personal conviction, whether religious or philosophical, or in relation to
outlooks on life. 3 This difficulty gets further exacerbated by the growing
radicalization of viewpoints in the public debate and in the dispute over
anthropological, ethical, religious, and civilizational assumptions
fundamental to the debate itself, which are also important criteria for the
assessment of artistic activity. It seems that when manoeuvring on the
level of law axiology, legal professionals have particular difficulty in
confronting the theses of art theorists and art critics, especially where the
latter refer to the method of deconstruction of traditional values,
symbols, concepts, normative, and cultural paradigms as proposed by the
post-modern humanities. The obligation of being worldview-impartial
on the side of public authorities, when combined with the assumptions
of deconstructionism, in the long-term threatens axiological nihilism and
decision-making incapacity of public authorities. These difficulties only
confirm that both the constitutional values and principles must be read
integrally, and applied to legal settlements of disputes over the limits of
freedom of art.
II. ARTISTIC CREATION AS A CONSTITUTIONAL TERM
Article 73 CRP stipulates that the freedom of artistic creation and
scientific research as well as dissemination of the fruits thereof, the
freedom to teach and to enjoy the products of culture, shall be ensured to

3.
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everyone. 4 However, the organic lawgiver does not define the concept of
artistic creation, which leaves one with the need to clarify the term in the
doctrine and jurisprudence. The use, in any court proceedings, of court
expert opinions in the field of artistic creation is problematic insofar as
in the theory and history of art, aesthetics, art criticism and cultural
studies diverse and sometimes diametrically different concepts of what
in essence artistic activity is have competed with each other for decades.
One of them is a classic, narrower concept, according to which the
essence of art is to imitate nature and complement its shortcomings in
the name of beauty, aesthetic values that is, and the role of the artist is to
explore, experience, creatively reformulate and present ever new
epiphanies of beauty. The function of art in this concept is to assist the
recipient, through beauty, in getting answers to fundamental existential
questions, in discovering and strengthening the essential, objective moral
values present in man and culture, such as goodness, truth, justice, and
love, which enable fulfilment of man as a personal being capable of
knowing and choosing good for its own sake. By another concept, the
one that predominates nowadays, the term “art” is an open-ended idea,
which refers to the activity of human spirit unfettered by any outer
limitations. Artistic activity is the self-defining exploration of the idea of
art, being often an uncompromising critique of tradition, its vision of
man and culture. Art in this concept is an autonomous and autotelic
sphere, and at the same time a tool to deconstruct culture and denounce
its idols, stereotypes, and habits. Underlying this approach to art, and at
the same time justifying the activity of artists, is a philosophical
assumption of relativism (cognitive and moral), a postmodern belief that
there are no objective, universal and neutral criteria of cultural debate
whatsoever. In the spirit of confrontation with the pre-existing aesthetic
convention, innovative substitute values are elevated, such as intuition,
conceptualization, improvisation, experiment, contestation, ostentatious
denial, scandal, and the transgression of taboo, meaning deliberately
trespassing the boundaries delimited by the most profoundly rooted
social norms, whether moral, religious, or legal.
So, which concept of the essence of artistic creation should take
preference in the process of interpretation of the law? A stance can be
found in the literature that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
artistic creation, which does not contain a legal definition of the matter
that it protects, allows for opening the law to all phenomenal forms of
contemporary art. By establishing the guarantee of freedom of artistic
4.

Id. at art. 73.
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creation without specifying the scope of its subject matter, the organic
lawgiver would thus explicitly waive the determination of its legal
contours, which would demand that any related evaluative legal
argumentation take a due account of autonomizing arguments. In other
words, in accordance with the Constitution, art would be an autonomous
good protected under the law. One should note, however, that artistic
creation, which has its particular structure, or language, is in fact one of
the kinds of social communication, so both the content and form of that
communication (communication of the artist with the recipients of the
work) is subject to social valuation, including a legal assessment.
Artistic activity refers to the different systems of values within which it
operates. One of the value groups is on the level of art studies, where
artistic creation is rather autonomous. Art here defines itself and is not
subject to external appraisal. Another normative level, external to the
first one, is the system of legal norms, in which artistic creation, like any
other activity undertaken in the social space, operates and also by which
it is governed. The different normative systems cannot be identified with
each other, as they derive from different sources and operate in distinct
paradigms. The constitutional concept of artistic creation, which belongs
to the legal system, should be interpreted not so much based on an
autonomous evaluation by art critics and art theorists, but in view of the
axiological assumptions and political principles resulting from the
content of the Basic Law.
III. METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES
In interpreting the notion of artistic creation in the perspective of
constitutional values and norms, one should note the methodological
differences that occur within the self-defining contemporary art (and,
consequently, within art studies) and under the applicable law. To a
large extent, contemporary art is based on the method of deconstruction
of symbols and concepts relating to any pre-existing social values,
specific to the post-modernist philosophy. The deconstruction of the
traditional cultural binder increasingly often becomes a substantive
justification, a formal assessment criterion and the promoted structure of
a work of art. Aware of certain standards of conduct in public life, the
artist deliberately confronts these to deconstrue their semantics.
“Unleashing free”, transgressing taboos, striving to eliminate any
external (social) and internal (moral) restrictions in the creative process
is an essential leitmotif of contemporary art, being an important tool of
the so-called counter-culture.
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With reference to the system of moral and ethical values, the basic
instrument of deconstruction is the claim of ambiguity of the concepts
fundamental for an ethical evaluation, and populating these with further
meanings. The outcomes are semantic humbugs, devaluation and
relativization of the classic values. By tricking adversaries into an area
of relativism, advocates of deconstruction argue that the concepts
underpinning the moral order can be stuffed with any content.
Simultaneously, the various interpretations of the concepts are to have
equal cognitive power, and none of them can claim exclusivity. The
legitimacy of referring in public debate to such value-carrying terms as
dignity, beauty, truth, goodness, justice, and responsibility is
consistently undermined.
One should note, however, that the methodological assumptions of
deconstructionism, admitted in contemporary humanities (especially
philosophy and art studies) cannot be used in the process of determining
the axiological and normative content of legislation. Interpretation of the
sources of law is based on the assumption that the terms used by the
legislator, as tools to identify the content of the applicable legal norms,
have their coded but specific range of meaning (the signified), which
only requires establishing. The law, with its specific method of
enactment and interpretation, unlike the idea of deconstruction, seeks to
clarify the concepts, construe definitions and precisely describe the
signified. The principles of good legislation and recognized methods of
interpretation require the utmost unequivocalness and substantive focus
on delivering certain values which are axiological foundations of the
legal system. Owing to a kind of conservative character on the levels of
semantics and axiology, the law provides itself stability, interpretative
potential and systematic continuity. On the contrary, post-modernism as
a rule refutes the pre-existing research paradigms, hence any integration
of jurisprudence with the humanities saturated with the idea of
deconstruction is extremely difficult, if not impossible.
Cultural changes can be depenalized, legalized or promoted on a
legal level, but this is only by defining them and changing the law,
which requires a broader social consensus, rather than by deconstruing
concepts in the interpretation of normative acts. The legal system
evolves along with culture but only by amendment, not a deconstruction
of the concepts of legal language. In the interpretive process, an
authority that applies the law cannot rely on a free, individualistic,
arbitrary interpretation of terms, unfettered – as post-modernists say – by
“the great meta-narratives”, because that authority would then create a
legal norm instead of decoding it out of a provision. This would be
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contrary to the principle of separation of powers. The authority must
take into account the objectives, the axiological preferences (i.e. “metanarratives”) that the legislator relied on. In continental law systems, a
legal act by essence is a barrier to arbitrary decisions by an authority that
applies the law, and not an invitation to more or less free interpretive
activity. With that approach, an authority that applies the law would then
claim the role of the legislator, in violation of the principle of separation
of powers, legality and the rule of law.
The essential methodological differences make the method of
deconstruction useless in the interpretation of the law. Therefore, any
criteria of artistic creation based on post-modern assumptions are of little
use in constitutional interpretation. The meaning of the concept of
artistic creation should be derived immanently from the order of values
and norms contained in the Basic Law. Thus, there may be kinds of
activity considered artistic in the circles of art theory and art criticism,
which do not coincide with the scope of the subject matter given to
artistic creation in the CRP. If the legally guaranteed freedom of artistic
expression is to take precedence over other forms of expression, then
this activity must be harmonized with the constitutional values and
norms. The guarantee of freedom of artistic creation cannot be a handy
formula used to attack these values and norms. Freedom of artistic
creation makes taking account of the axiology of the Constitution a
must.
IV. AXIOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK OF FREEDOM OF ARTISTIC CREATION
In an attempt to outline the axiological framework of freedom of
artistic creation, one cannot ignore the preamble to the Constitution.
Though one cannot derive legal norms from the text of the preamble in
the strict sense, its analysis, as the Constitutional Court held, may
provide guidance, based on a true expression by the organic law-giver,
as to the directions for interpretation of provisions of the normative part
of the Constitution as originally intended. 5 The preamble, in turn,
identifies four basic universal values, i.e. truth, justice, goodness, and
beauty. 6 The emphasized universality of these values means that in the
opinion of the organic lawgiver the concepts that express them carry
objective moral content. They are relevant to the entire legal order, and
therefore constitute a point of reference (evaluation) for the legal
5. Trybunał Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal] May 11, 2005, K 18/04 at 8 (OTK-A
2005, No. 5, item 49).
6. KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 2, 1997, pmbl.
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relationships of all citizens of the Republic. The map of constitutional
axiology is made more precise by the emphasis in the preamble put on
the values of culture rooted in the Christian heritage of the Nation and in
universal human values. Moreover, the organic law-giver links the
freedoms of the individual to justice and social dialogue, and formulates
the obligation of solidarity with others, combined with concern for the
preservation of human dignity, which means, among other things, the
rejection of the idea of class struggle. Freedom of artistic expression,
which enjoys constitutional protection, is not alienated vis-a-vis the
constitutional values and norms, and therefore it is not absolute or
unlimited. The very notion of artistic creation is not at the same time
indefinable or capacious enough to be able to justify an omission,
neglect or breach of the axiological preferences of the organic lawgiver
as expressed in the basic law.
What follows is that artistic creation, the freedom of which is
subject to legal protection, cannot be explained by an open-ended,
autonomous definition, but should be referred to other constitutional
values and norms, including–at the axiological level–to beauty, truth,
goodness and justice, which the legislator considers the objective criteria
of evaluation. Beauty is not recognized in purely formal terms (aesthetic
terms) but in axiological terms, as corresponding to goodness, truth, and
justice (beautiful is what is true, just, and good on the basis of
constitutional axiology). Of course, these values should not be made
instrumental by public authorities, as they were in modernism (a variety
of idealism) and totalitarian systems rejected by the organic lawgiver, as
projections of party ideology to be guarded by an institution of
censorship. They should be read on the basis of cognitive realism from
the perspective of the common good– that is, in conjunction with Article
1 CRP. 7 Thus, if artistic activity attempted to impose or promote antivalues within the meaning of constitutional axiology, i.e. falsehood,
injustice, evil, ugliness (understood axiologically), then such activity
would not mean artistic creation whose freedom is guaranteed by the
Constitution. Furthermore, no one could rely on that freedom if it were
to justify the violation of human dignity, class struggle, or attack on
culture rooted in the Christian heritage of the Nation (that without
additional reference to Article 53–freedom of conscience and religion, or
Article 54–freedom to express opinions, including their limitations). 8

7.
8.

Id. at art. 1.
Id. at art. 53-54.
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V. STATUTORY BOUNDARIES OF FREEDOM OF ARTISTIC CREATION
Contrary to what one sometimes hears from people professionally
operating in the world of art, entertainment and media, one should note
that the legal guarantees of freedoms and civil rights, including freedom
of expression and artistic creation, also assume their limitations.
Interdependencies between individual constitutional freedoms and rights
imply the necessity of limiting them, so as to prevent the abuse of rights.
Relying on the constitutional guarantee of a freedom or right does not
allow one the freedom to interfere in another freedom or right. One of
the foundations of constitutionalism is the principle of setting boundaries
to the freedom of the individual where it encounters the freedom or right
of another entity. The constitutional freedom of artistic creation is not by
itself a legal basis to justify the artist’s violating the law. There is no
reason to believe that freedom of artistic creation enjoys a special
constitutional protection, a much stronger one than the other freedoms
and rights, and takes precedence in the event of a conflict with the other
rights and freedoms. One may not treat freedom of artistic creation as a
key to open the boundaries of freedom in which this freedom is
embedded.
The constitutional guarantee of the protection of freedoms,
including freedom of artistic creation, is a mandate addressed to the
ordinary legislator to provide for guarantees of such freedoms in statutes
governing the various spheres of life, and implies the determination of
their boundaries in the form of statutory prohibitions or orders, taking
into account the respect for and delivering on the constitutional
axiology. Freedom of artistic expression is therefore subject to
restrictions with regard to the provision of Article 31 CRP, and thus in
order to determine its boundaries it is necessary to formulate and analyze
the various norms contained in the legal acts of the statute rank. 9
The competence of the legislature to define the limits of freedom of
artistic creation is confirmed by the jurisprudence of the European Court
of Human Rights. Under the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, public morality was decided to be a
value which limits the freedom of art, for instance. 10 The Court
emphasized in this context that although one must not unnecessarily
interfere with the freedom of expression, it is the wide margin of
appreciation and the absence of a European concept of morality that
allows the state to interfere with the freedom of artistic expression, if the
9.
10.

Id. at art. 31.
Müller v. Switzerland, 133 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) at 18 (1988).
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work is presented in a public place. 11 The Court held, among other
things, that if the work is without a reason and offensive to others, it
does not gain legal protection. 12 It appears also that the provision of
Article 13 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
which stipulates that the arts and scientific research shall be free from
restrictions, should be read in conjunction with the principle of
proportionality, as set out in Article 52 (1) of the Charter. 13 In this
context, the freedom of art may be subject to restrictions with a view to
protecting the public order or public morality. Moral argumentation here
is of a particular nature, as it refers to the realm of tradition and cultural
heritage of the Member States, due to the fact that there is no single
European morality. Member States enjoy in this respect the power of
assessment and the margin of appreciation, which lend legitimacy to the
application of national measures restricting the freedom of art. It would
be difficult to accept the view that the European legislator does not
recognize any boundaries of freedom of artistic activity. The historical
experience of Europe has shown that uncontrolled art may violate the
limits of dignity and the freedom of others, and serve the escalation of
violence and the emergence of social unrest. Suffice it to say that antiSemitism, also present in literature and art, was a path paved to the
Holocaust.
VI. CONCLUSION
At the heart of the debate on the boundaries of art there is the
problem of reconciling two legitimate aspirations. The first one is the
desire to respect and preserve the fundamental social values, protected
by moral, religious and legal norms rooted in the culture of a society. On
the other side there is the desire to respect the freedom of artistic activity
and creative sovereignty, which, however, sometimes takes on a formula
of not only uncompromising criticism of the pre-existing system of
values, but of deliberate public trespassing of boundaries, violation of
norms, and breaking of social prohibitions. With a view to protecting
goods such as public order and safety, environment, public health,
morality or the rights and freedoms of others, the legislator imposes
statutory restrictions also on artists and organizers of artistic activity. In
contemporary culture, this task is extremely difficult because of the
11. Id. at 17-18.
12. Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 295-A Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) at 14 (1994).
13. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 13, 52(1), 2010 O.J. C 83/02,
at 394, 402.
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ideas of deconstruction of the traditionally recognized concepts, values
and social norms penetrating the humanities as grown from post-modern
philosophy.
The point of reference for setting legal limits to freedom of artistic
creation lies in the constitutional values that emanate from the four basic
universal (considered objective) “mega-values”–that is, truth, justice,
goodness and beauty–being the carriers of moral content corresponding
to the axiological preferences of the organic law-giver. Beauty on this
list is recognized axiologically as corresponding to the goodness, truth
and justice within the framework of the other constitutional values and
norms. This understanding of beauty is a clue to guide the interpretation
of the constitutional term of artistic creation and the setting of the
boundaries of free creative activity. The constitutional concept of artistic
creation can be interpreted in neither an autonomizing nor a utilitarian
(instrumental) manner, as it refers art to the system of universal values
identified in the Basic Law. The legally guaranteed freedom of artistic
creation, without a doubt, encompasses the possibility of using
contemporary means of artistic expression recognized in art studies
(innovation, conceptualization, shock), yet using them–if it is to be
protected by the law–must fall within the scope of activities aimed at
delivering on the constitutional values.
Public authorities, generally, should not interfere with artistic
creation themselves and are obliged to protect artists against such
interference from other entities, may, for the purposes of constitutional
values, not particular ideological purposes, support financially and
organizationally selected artistic projects. Such a policy does not
discriminate against those artists whose activities are directed towards
the deconstruction of the values preferred by the organic lawgiver. What
is more, if an artist or organizer of art in the course of their artistic
activities fulfilled the attributes of an offence, they may not, in principle,
rely on the freedom of art as a circumstance legally justifying their
behaviour. In the absence of any specific provision allowing the
behaviour fulfilling the attributes of an offence within such activities, the
artistic context of the act does not exclude the legal liability of the artist
or the exhibitor of a work of art for trespassing the statutory limits under
the law.

